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Abstract
The signiﬁcance of the Second World War for Soviet geography was somewhat different from that in much of the West. In the USSR, as a result of the 1917
Russian Revolution and, more particularly, of Joseph Stalin’s ‘Great Turn’ implemented in 1929e1933, geographers were faced with pronounced political
and economic challenges of a kind which arguably only confronted most Western geographers with the onset of war. It is therefore impossible to un-
derstand the impact of the war for Soviet geography without taking into account this broader context, including events during the turbulent post-war
years. The paper will focus on the experiences of two prominent geographers who played a major role in the developments of the era including their
responses to the revolutionary circumstances occurring from the late 1920s, their activities and experiences during the war, and the debates and conﬂicts
they engaged in during the post-war crisis. Some of the more signiﬁcant contrasts with geographical developments in Western countries during these
years will be emphasized.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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the German blockade of the city by Soviet forces, some 600 or so
geographers and other delegates, plus guests, gathered in Lenin-
grad for the Second All-Union Geographical Congress. Surprisingly
enough, in view of their recent experiences of war, the Congress
delegates seem to have had relatively little to say about the war
itself, at least if the published Congress reports are anything to go
by.1 However, one senior delegate, namely Academician Andrei
Grigor’ev, Director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of
Geography (IGAN), did so indirectly in his presentation entitled
‘The contemporary tasks of Soviet geography’.2 On page 124 of his
report, Grigor’ev refers to the now much-cited paper by Edward
Ackerman, ‘Geographic training, wartime research, and immediate
professional objectives’ which had been published in the Annals of
the Association of American Geographers for 1945.3 As is well known,
in this paper Ackerman dwelt on the wartime experiences of US* Corresponding author. School of Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences, Uni
E-mail address: D.J.B.Shaw@bham.ac.uk.
1 Trudy Vtorogo Geograﬁcheskogo s’ezda, Vols. 1e2, Moscow, 1948.
2 A.A. Grigor’ev, Sovremennye zadachi Sovetskoi geograﬁi, Trudy Vtorogo s’ezda, Vol. 1
3 E.A. Ackerman, Geographic training, wartime research, and immediate professional
4 Ackerman, Geographic training (note 3), 122.
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0305-7488/ 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articlegeographers, especially those working in the Ofﬁce of Strategic
Services (OSS) inWashington DC. According to Ackerman, ‘Wartime
experience has highlighted a number of ﬂaws in theoretical
approach and in past methods of training men (sic) for the pro-
fession’.4 Among those ﬂaws, Ackerman pointed in particular to US
geographers’ unfamiliarity with foreign geographical literature, an
almost universal ignorance of foreign languages, bibliographic
ineptness, a general lack of systematic specialisms, and their focus
on a regional geographical method which emphasized an unsci-
entiﬁc holism. By contrast, argued Grigor’ev, it is these very prob-
lems with which Soviet geographers had been grappling for the
previous ﬁfteen years. In his view, the Soviet adoption of dialectical
materialism had led to a systematic study of the earth’s many
environmental and social processes and to a scientiﬁc emphasis on
the ‘dynamic development of individual territories and of the earth
as a whole’.5 Had they known of this claim, Western geographersversity of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK.
, 122e134.
objectives, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 35 (1945) 121e143.
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crude, Cold War propaganda. Part of the purpose of this paper is to
examine the validity of Grigor’ev’s assertion.
Ackerman’s paper has also been cited by Trevor Barnes in the
latter’s muchmore recent work on American geographers’ wartime
experiences in the OSS, using a variety of sources.6 Barnes’ thesis is
that American geography was ultimately changed by the experi-
ence of war: ‘Approaches to war now shaped geographical
thought’.7 Many of the wartime deﬁciencies identiﬁed by Acker-
man, deﬁciencies particularly pertaining to the human side of the
discipline, were eventually met, if not always resolved, by geogra-
phers adopting the more rigorous and scientiﬁc methodologies
recommended in Ackerman’s paper. In time this helped give rise to
the Quantitative Revolution. Again, in discussing the wartime work
and experiences of Soviet geographers, the paper will query the
extent to which Barnes’ thesis might also be said to apply to the
USSR.
This paper is informed by a variety of recent literature. In
particular, the broad literature on the history, sociology and geog-
raphies of science is important as underlining one of the central
points of this paper, which is that the development of science,
rather than being sui generis, is in fact very much shaped by the
social, political and cultural context in which it occurs.8 That being
the case, the development of geography in Russia and the USSR, and
the effects of the war on that development, are unlikely to have
been the same as in the USA.9 Also important for this paper is the
recent literature on Stalinism and, in particular, on the relationship
between science and politics under Stalin.10 Here the key point is
that an earlier generation of Western scholars, hampered by a lack
of access to Soviet sources, and no doubt often inﬂuenced by Cold
War attitudes, tended to stress the sharp differences between the
comparative freedom of Western scientists operating in ‘demo-
cratic’ societies, and the lack of freedom of Soviet scientists subject
to ‘totalitarian’ controls and political diktat. By contrast, more
recent scholarship has stressed the often subtle and two-way
relationship which existed between Soviet scientists and the Sta-
linist state, with the former often seeking patrons among Party and
state ofﬁcials, and political ideology being a ﬂexible rather than
rigid instrument of control. In this way, and following Krementsov,
we might say that the development of Soviet geography, whilst
perhaps appearing ‘strange’ by Western standards, was by no
means entirely alien to geography’s development in the West.11
In order to open up the experiences of Soviet geographers
during the Second World War, the paper focuses in particular on
the activities of two inﬂuential Soviet geographers, the aforemen-
tioned Andrei Grigor’ev, and one of his main professional rivals, Lev
Berg. Both geographers played key roles in the intellectual and
institutional development of Soviet geography and an overview of
their respective contributions is provided below. More speciﬁcally,
the often antagonistic relationship between the two academics and6 T.J. Barnes, Geographical intelligence: American geographers and research and anal
(2006) 149e168.
7 Barnes, Geographical intelligence (note 6), 163.
8 See, for example, T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions, Chicago, enlarged e
Contested Enterprise, Oxford, 1992, especially 1e31; J. Golinski,Making Natural Knowledge
Science in its Place: Geographies of Scientiﬁc Knowledge, Chicago, 2003.
9 For a discussion of the Russian and Soviet case, see L. Mazurkiewicz, Human Geogra
10 See, for example: L. Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union, Cambridge, 199
Gorbachev, Berkeley, 1999; N. Krementsov, Stalinist Science, Princeton, 1997; E. Pollock, Sta
Soviet science, Osiris 23 (2008) 115e135; S.G. Solomon, Circulation of knowledge and th
11 Krementsov, Stalinist Science (note 10), 287.
12 D.J.M. Hooson, The development of geography in pre-Soviet Russia, Annals of the Asso
15e35; D.J.B. Shaw, Geographical practice and its signiﬁcance in Peter the Great’s Russitheir differing experiences during the war years provide us with an
opportunity to assess, at least in part, the nature of the war’s in-
ﬂuence on the method and practice of Soviet geography.
This paper is based partly on the published books and periodical
literature produced by Soviet geographers during the period be-
tween the early 1930s and the early 1950s (coinciding largely with
the Stalin era), supplemented by more recent research by Russian
scholars. The present writers have undertaken some work in
Russian archives, which are generally more accessible than they
were in Soviet times (though military archives remain difﬁcult to
access) but are conscious of the fact that much more remains to be
done before a full picture of the wartime activities of the Soviet
geographers and their consequences can be painted.
Geography in Russia and the USSR: pre-war developments
In keeping with the general thesis that science has the potential to
develop differently in different places, something must be said
about the particularities of geography’s development in Russia and
the USSR before an account of the wartime experiences of Soviet
geographers can be given.
Professional geography in Russia can be said to date from 1884
when a government decree ordered geography departments or
chairs (kafedry) to be established in the Russian universities. Over
the next few years a series of departments appeared, often led by
scholars trained in the natural sciences. The developing character of
geography in Russia was shaped not only by German and European
inﬂuences but also by Russia’s own geographical tradition which
arguably reached back to the founding of the Academy of Sciences
by Peter the Great in 1725.12 The Academy’s expeditionary work,
supplemented by that of other government and scientiﬁc bodies
like the Russian Geographical Society established in 1845, was
designed to explore, survey and map the remote corners of the
Russian empire, and to record the natural resources to be found
there. This helped endow Russian geography with at least three
speciﬁc characteristics as it began to emerge from the 1880s: an
emphasis on ﬁeldwork and exploration, a bias towards the physical
rather than the human side of the discipline (and consequently
geography’s growing proximity to cognate sciences like geology,
soil science andmeteorology), and the signiﬁcant role played by the
state as reﬂected in the importance frequently (but not always)
accorded to the applied and policy-oriented aspects of research.
The importance of the state to Russian science (and to other
areas of Russian life) no doubt reﬂected in part an ofﬁcial con-
sciousness of Russian backwardness relative to other European
states and a general determination from the time of Peter to speed
Russian development along European lines. It was also related to
the sheer size of the Russian empire and the state’s need for
detailed knowledge of its territory. Strategic concerns were to the
fore with the establishment in 1915, under the auspices of theysis in the Ofﬁce of Strategic Services, 1941e45, Journal of Historical Geography 32
dition 1970; D.N. Livingstone, The Geographical Tradition: Episodes in the History of a
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Productive Forces (KEPS) with a brief to engage in the systematic
survey of the country’s resource base as a wartime defensive
measure.13 KEPS had a positive impact on the status of pre-
revolutionary professional geography and would go on to facili-
tate the institutional advancement of the discipline during the early
Soviet period. The commission was chaired by the eminent
mineralogist and biogeochemist, V.I. Vernadskii, who was close to
the geographers, and several geographers served as members,
including both Berg and Grigor’ev. This wartime experience fur-
nished the geographers with an appreciation of how their skills
might be used for military ends. As Grigor’ev’s recent biographer,
T.D. Aleksandrova, has written: ‘[Grigor’ev] often said that war did
not ﬁnd the geographers unprepared. Undoubtedly, there spoke his
experience in the 1914e1918 war in the KEPS commission’.14
Furthermore, it provided the basis for purposeful collaboration
between the state and natural scientists in areas of natural resource
exploration, assessment and evaluation, which would continue, in
various guises, until the Second World War. The resulting expertise
and systems of operation would prove invaluable during the early
years of the War as the Soviet economy reordered itself in response
to the German invasion.
The Bolshevik seizure of power in November 1917 naturally
changed the entire political context within which the geographers
and other scientists operated, though the impact on sciencewas not
immediate. The Bolsheviks were modernizers, quickly recognizing
the importance of science and their dependence on scientists
educated under the old regime. The scientists were soon beneﬁt-
ting in consequence. In geography, for example, the new govern-
ment established a specialized Geographical Institute in Petrograd/
Leningrad (in 1918), whose second rector was the prominent
mineralogist A.E. Fersman (a secretary of KEPS from 1915).15 Its
major purpose was to train specialized geographers and to expand
expeditionary and survey work in science.16 In 1925 the institute
was transformed into the Geography Faculty of Leningrad State
University. Meanwhile, and reﬂecting the Bolshevik emphasis on
applied science in general, many new scientiﬁc research institutes
were established in universities, government ministries and other
organizations.
Until the late 1920s Soviet science remained a modiﬁed version
of pre-1917 science, but now fully dependent on state resourcing
with the abolition of private funding (and in that sense ‘national-
ized’). It also remained open to foreign, especially German, in-
ﬂuences.17 The First World War and the new priorities of the Soviet
regime had led to a renewed emphasis on the applied nature of
Soviet geography, but had not changed its essential nature.18 All this
was to change fundamentally in the next few years. Over the period
between 1929 and the mid-1930s Joseph Stalin, who had by now
fully consolidated his dictatorship over the Communist Party and
over society as a whole, inaugurated what became known as ‘The13 See A.V. Kol’tsov, Sozdanie i deiatel’nosti Komissii po izucheniiu estestvennykh proizvod
Russian Civil War, and the invention of Big Science, Science in Context 15 (2002) 239e2
14 T.D. Aleksandrova, Akademik Andrei Aleksandrovich Grigor’ev: zhizn’ i nauchnoe tvorc
15 Otchet o deiatel’nosti Komissii po izucheniiu estestvennykh proizvoditel’nykh sil Rossii s
16 Geograﬁcheskii Institut. Geograﬁia, ee prakticheskie zadach i znachenie dlia gosudarstv
17 Krementsov, Stalinist Science (note 10), 13e30.
18 For more on how Soviet science changed after 1917, see: L.R. Graham, The formatio
ternational borrowing, Social Studies of Science 5 (1975) 303e329; M.B. Adams, Scienc
Solomon (Eds), The Social Context of Soviet Science, Boulder, 1980, 173e204.
19 Krementsov, Stalinist Science (note 10), 3.
20 See Krementsov, Stalinist Science (note 10); D. Joravsky, The Lysenko Affair, New York,
Ivanovich Vavilov: stranitsy biograﬁi, Moscow, 2008.
21 L.S. Berg, Dostizheniia Sovetskoi geograﬁi (1917e1947), Leningrad, 1948. Although not s
Committee (GOSPLAN), the Committee for the Investigation of the Productive Forces of
22 See, for example, A. Nove, The Soviet Economic System, London, 1977, 365.Great Turn’ involving the complete centralization of economic ac-
tivity in the command economy, the collectivization of agriculture,
and a thoroughgoing cultural revolution. For science the changes
were profound. Essentially, in Krementsov’s words, as a result of
the ‘Great Turn’, ‘Stalinist science [became] Big Science, a gigantic
centralized system with thousands of institutions and hundreds of
thousands of scientists’ e in fact the world’s ﬁrst example of Big
Science, centrally funded and politically controlled, oriented to-
wards the government’s priorities, and subject to planning like the
rest of the economy.19 In other words, whilst the First World War
and the Revolution had merely placed new emphasis on
geography’s applied side, science now became central to the Bol-
sheviks’ determination to build a new, socialist society. In the mid-
1930s Stalin unleashed the Great Terror, directed at those who
failed to conform orwho fell out of favour for one reason or another.
In the purged institutions (which included the Academy of Sci-
ences, especially after 1929) many scientists were demoted or
sacked, many arrested, and many disappeared into the camps.
Among the geographers and their associates the most prominent
victim was the major geneticist Nikolai Vavilov, friend of Berg and
president of the Geographical Society between 1931 and 1940.20
Vavilov was arrested in 1940 as a result of his rivalry with the
scientiﬁc fraudster, Troﬁm Lysenko, and perished in prison in Sar-
atov in 1943.
Geography, of course, was very much affected by these events.
Thus geographers were now ordered to conform to ofﬁcial re-
quirements in teaching and research and to direct their activities
towards applied science.21 However, after the ‘Great Turn’, uni-
versities were to be primarily responsible for teaching whilst much
research was henceforth to be undertaken by more specialized
bodies, particularly the Academy of Sciences. On the basis of the
practical signiﬁcance and achievements of KEPS during the First
WorldWar, the Academy was able to argue for the establishment of
a series of specialized research institutes devoted to working for
Soviet development. Among these was the Institute of Geography.
However, since the evolution of this institute was verymuch bound
up with the career of Andrei Grigor’ev, its consideration will be left
to the next section.
It is important to stress, therefore, that pressures on Soviet
geographers to demonstrate their scientiﬁc rigour and ability to
contribute to national goals long predated the war. As a result of
the Revolution and especially of Stalin’s ‘Great Turn’, the entire
context in which Soviet geographers operated was very different
from that in the West. Indeed, since the Soviet command econ-
omy has often been compared to the wartime economies of
Western capitalist states, it could be asserted that, in the 1930s,
Soviet geographers found themselves plunged into what amoun-
ted to wartime emergency conditions long before the war itself
broke out.22itel’nykh sil Rossii, 1915e1930, St Petersburg, 1999; A. Kojevnikov, The Great War, the
75.
hestvo, Moscow, 2011, 217.
ostoiashchei pri Imperatorskoi Akademii nauk za 1916 god, Petrograd, 1917, 35.
ennogo stroitel’stva, Petrograd, 1922.
n of Soviet research institutes: a combination of revolutionary innovation and in-
e, ideology and structure, the Kol’tsov Institute, 1900e1970, in: L.L. Lubrano, S.G.
1970; P. Pringle, The Murder of Nikolai Vavilov, New York, 2008; V.D. Esakov, Nikolai
peciﬁcally discussed by Berg, geographers in the 1930s served on the State Planning
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geography
Lev Berg and Andrei Grigor’ev, the two geographers who form the
focus of this study, were central to geographical developments in
the Stalin period. In order to understand the signiﬁcance of their
activities during the war and its aftermath, it is important to say
something about their backgrounds and the pre-war debates in
which they participated.
Lev Semenovich Berg (1876e1950) was born in the city of
Bendery in present-dayMoldova, the son of a Jewish notary. In 1894
he was admitted to Moscow University where he gravitated to-
wards zoology and geography. After graduation he studied the
lakes and rivers of Central Asia and was awarded a doctorate on
account of his 1908 dissertation on the Aral Sea. In 1916 Berg took
the post of professor at Petrograd (formerly St Petersburg) Uni-
versity and later at the Geographical Institute. In view of his
numerous, well-received publications and other activities, he
received many honours and, in 1928, was elected a corresponding
member of the Academy of Sciences (he became a full member in
1946). In 1940, Berg was elected to succeed the recently-arrested
Nikolai Vavilov as president of the All-Union Geographical Soci-
ety, a position he held until his death in 1950.
Andrei Aleksandrovich Grigor’ev (1883e1968) was born in St
Petersburg, the son of an army ofﬁcer. Entering St Petersburg Uni-
versity, he later studied in Berlin and then Heidelberg where he
participated in Alfred Hettner’s geography seminar. Awarded a
doctorate in Heidelberg, Grigor’ev returned to Russia, working for a
period for the Brokgauz and Efron encyclopedia. He then joined
KEPS and rose to head its geographical section. In 1930 this section
became the Geomorphological Institute which eventually became
the Institute of Geography (IGAN) in Moscow in 1936 with Gri-
gor’ev as director. Grigor’ev was elected a full member of the
Academy of Sciences in 1939 and remained director of IGAN until
1951. As a fully-ﬂedged institute of the Academy of Sciences, IGAN
became the USSR’s principal geographical research institution and
was destined to play a leading role in the wartime activities of the
geographers.
One signiﬁcant difference between the contexts in which Soviet
and US geographers worked in the 1930s and 1940s was the for-
mer’s need to pay heed to the prevailing political ideology
(although the era of McCarthyism in the late 1940smay have had an
analogous effect in the case of the US geographers).23 In the USSR
ideology stimulated lively debates across the sciences in this
period. In geography the debates focused around the opposed
views of Berg and Grigor’ev regarding the essence and purpose of
geography, particularly physical geography. As shall be seen, both
positions were bound up with issues of practicality as well as
ideological rectitude.24
Lev Berg’s view of geography was ﬁrst propounded in 1913 and
1915. For Berg, geography should be focused on the study of land-
scapes, naturally occurring biophysical units into which the earth’s
surface is subdivided and which might easily be discovered in the
ﬁeld. Here Berg seems to have been inﬂuenced by the Russian soil
science school of V.V. Dokuchaev (1846e1903). However, in his
paper of 1915, Berg also claimed a link to the ideas of the respected23 See D. Harvey, Owen Lattimore: a memoir, Antipode 15 (1983) 3e11. We are gratefu
24 For more details, see D.J.B. Shaw and J.D. Oldﬁeld, Landscape science: a Russian g
111e126; D.J.B. Shaw and J.D. Oldﬁeld, Totalitarianism and geography: L. S. Berg and the
96e112; D.J.B. Shaw and J.D. Oldﬁeld, Scientiﬁc, institutional and personal rivalries among
25 A. Hettner, Geograﬁia: ee istoriia, sushchnost’ i metody, Moscow-Leningrad, 1930.
26 For explanation of this concept, see Shaw and Oldﬁeld, Scientiﬁc, institutional and p
27 A.E. Fersman, Geograﬁia na sluzhbe voiny, Voprosy Geograﬁi 128 (1985) 25e30. Fersm
i uchenye Rossii v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, 1941e1945: ocherki, vospominaniia, dGerman geographer, Alfred Hettner (1859e1941). The latter’s neo-
Kantian concept of geography emphasized its chorological char-
acter, and his major work, Geography: its history, substance and
methods, was republished in the USSR as late as 1930.25 For Berg,
the major advantage of Hettner’s view was that it endowed geog-
raphy with its own unique object of study, namely the region or
place. In addition, Berg also claimed the practical usefulness of the
landscape approach. Thus, the ﬁrst edition of his Landscape-
geographical zones of the USSR was published in 1930 by N.I. Vavi-
lov’s All-Union Institute of Plant Breeding which was dedicated to
the breeding of high-yielding, disease-resistant crops for agricul-
ture. In the view of Vavilov, Berg’s comprehensive, geographical
study of the USSR’s natural zones (biomes) facilitated exactly that
end.
Unfortunately for Berg, however, by the 1930s Hettner was
coming under increasing political attack. He was seen as an anti-
Marxist and, moreover, suspicious foreign scholar whose choro-
logical concept of geography was not only unscientiﬁc and partic-
ularistic but abetted notions of environmental determinism. Indeed
the sin of ‘Hettnerism’ was soon being used by Stalinist geogra-
phers as a sinister epithet with which to tar their opponents. And
one of the leading champions of the anti-Hettnerite camp was
Andrei Grigor’ev. Grigor’ev, as mentioned above, was a former
student of Hettner, but from the late 1920s, whilst still working for
KEPS, he distanced himself more and more from Hettner’s ideas
and migrated from economic (human) into physical geography.
From the early 1930s, Grigor’ev began to advocate what he termed
a new approach to geography based on the concept of ‘the single
physicalegeographical process’,26 a rival to landscape geography.
Grigor’ev believed that this approach was not only consonant with
the dynamic principles of dialectical materialism, but, focused on
process rather than on the relatively static and conservative
concept of landscape, was more relevant to the growing ofﬁcial
emphasis on industrialization and nature transformation. Like Berg,
then, Grigor’ev strove to position geography as an essentially
practical science even prior to the demands of the war, inﬂuenced
both by the radical state policies of the 1930s and by longer-term
trends linked to the strategic development of the country’s natu-
ral resources.
Soviet geographers in the Great Patriotic War
In an article, ‘Geography in the service of the war’, written in 1942,
A.E. Fersman argued that the war had led to a re-evaluation of the
importance of several of the sciences, including geography.27 Ac-
cording to Fersman, who was clearly trying to boost the wartime
signiﬁcance of those sciences falling within his purview, geography,
which before the war had often been regarded as a second-order,
descriptive discipline, now ranked among the sciences playing a
primary role in the solution of ‘the most important and most
difﬁcult problems of the world conﬂict’. Fersman argued that this
re-evaluation had occurred for two reasons: ﬁrstly because geog-
raphy had now become a science of interconnections, including
those between society and nature, a knowledge of which was vital
in the evaluation of all the complexities of battleﬁeld conditions.
The second reasonwas that geographywas the science dealingwithl to Trevor Barnes for this reference.
eographical tradition, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 97 (2007)
defence of an academic discipline in the age of Stalin, Political Geography 27 (2008)
Soviet geographers in the late Stalin era, EuropeeAsia Studies 60 (2008) 1397e1418.
ersonal rivalries (note 24), 1403.
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okumenty, Moscow, 1996, 71e88 (71).
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their speedy and effective use, so necessary in the extreme condi-
tions of wartime. In other words, in Fersman’s view, geography was
now vital to the Soviet war effort.
According to L.S. Abramov of IGAN, a leading scholar of the ac-
tivities of the geographers during the war, an unfortunate effect of
the discipline’s apparently low pre-war status was that many as-
pects of what might be termed ‘military geography’ were badly
neglected, certainly by comparison with the Axis powers.28 Thus
the USSR had possessed no uniﬁed military-geographical service
and contacts between the military and the geographers were
minimal. The teaching of military geography, including the making
and interpretation of maps, was a low priority in the military
academies. Modern topographical maps were available only for the
border regions west of a line between Moscow and Kiev. Indeed,
the prevailing military doctrine was that any war would largely be
fought on the territory of the enemy. Detailed territorial de-
scriptions of Soviet territory, designed for military use, weremainly
economic rather than physical in character and badly dated. Before
1940, when IGAN beganwork on detailed geographical descriptions
of the USSR’s potential enemies in eastern and central Europe, the
Soviet authorities possessed no such materials. Only at a late stage
did SOPS (the Council for the Study of Productive Forces, successor
to KEPS) begin to investigate the possibilities of evacuating vital
industries and other activities to the east.
Inevitably, then, Soviet geographers emerged to play a signiﬁ-
cant role during the war years in a number of areas of vital military
importance. However, to some degree this work was initially
hampered by the large-scale evacuation of academic institutions to
the east in 1941 and early 1942.29 Indeed, soon after the Germans
launched their wholly unexpected invasion of the USSR on June 22,
1941, it became apparent that the cities of Moscow and Leningrad
were in grave danger of capture. In these circumstances, the Soviet
authorities quickly took the decision to move their more important
scientists to places of safety. Their reasoning was explained by
Berg’s daughter, Raisa: ‘Every one of the cities where evacuated
academicians [had] lived turned out to be in a zone near the front. If
those cities had been captured by the Germans, the victors would
have acquired for their disposal enormous capital in the form of
scholars and scientists of all specialities. Evacuation, sometimes
forced, was supposed to avert that calamity’.30
Thus a major part of IGAN was evacuated to Alma Ata, capital of
Kazakhstan, by the late autumn of 1941, where it established itself
on the base of the Kazakh branch of the Academy of Sciences,
together with six other Academy of Sciences institutes.31 Headed by
Grigor’ev, the outpost continued to work closely with colleagues
from the Institutes of Soil and Botany and also forged links with
local academics.32 Meanwhile, geographers working in institutions
located throughout the USSR, when not ﬁghting in the war or
ﬁnding themselves living in occupied territory, became engaged in28 Abramov, Geograﬁia voiskam (note 27), 72e75. However, Smith and Black, and Troll,
less close than Abramov suggests. See T.R. Smith and L.D. Black, German geography:
Geographic science in Germany during the period 1933e1945: a critique and justiﬁcati
29 See B.V. Levshin, Rossiiskie nauchnye uchrezhdeniia i uchenye v Velikoi Otechestve
30 R.L. Berg, Acquired Traits: Memoirs of a Geneticist from the Soviet Union, New York, 19
31 B.V. Levshin, Sovetskaia nauka v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, Moscow, 1983, 42
32 L.S. Abramov, Geograﬁia e dlia pobedy, Voprosy Geograﬁi 128 (1985) 13e24 (22).
33 A.G. Doskach, A.S. Kes’, O.P. Nazarevskii and M.I. Pomus, Geograﬁia v uchrezhdeniiakh
Akademii Nauk SSSR: seriia geograﬁcheskaia (1975) no. 3, 5e12 (6).
34 See Levshin, Rossiiskie (note 29), 81; Abramov, Geograﬁia e dlia pobedy (note 32),
35 V.M. Kotliakov (Ed), Institut Geograﬁi Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk i ego liudi: k 90-letiiu
36 Abramov, Geograﬁia voiskam (note 27), 78.
37 Kotliakov, Institut (note 35), 19e20.
38 V.M. Kotliakov and V.S. Preobrazhenskii, Akademicheskaia geograﬁia e vooruzhenny
(15).war work of various kinds. The rest of this section will focus on the
work of geographers in IGAN as emblematic of the kind of research
and military-related activity undertaken in these years.
Doskach and her colleagues have suggested that IGAN’s early
war work developed in two main directions: ﬁrstly, servicing the
needs of the front through the generation of military-geographical
information, and secondly assisting the extensive mobilization of
natural resources on the home front.33 With regard to the second,
IGAN’s role particularly related to work done in Kazakhstan and
more will be said about this in the section below on the wartime
activities of Grigor’ev. But it is also important to mention the
involvement of geographers from IGAN, as well as those from
Moscow University (MGU) and elsewhere, in two special commis-
sions. The ﬁrst was the Commission for the Mobilization of the
Resources of the Urals, which began its activities in Sverdlovsk
(Ekaterinburg) in August 1941 on the basis of pre-war research. This
work was soon to be extended into West Siberia and northern
Kazakhstan (involving over 800 scientists and other specialists).
The second Commission was that for the Mobilization of the Re-
sources of the Volga and Kama regions, which was based on the city
of Kazan’ and began work in June 1942.34 The aims of both these
commissions were essentially similar: to survey the natural and
economic resources of these regions with a view to enhancing their
contribution to the war effort, to seek out possibilities for the
evacuation of populations and economic activities, and to substi-
tute for resources lost to the enemy in the west. In addition, and
also in regard to the home front, IGAN was involved elsewhere in
the search for minerals and other kinds of resources, and for
effective ways of using them, notably in the Komi Republic in the
north, in the Caucasus and Siberia.
With regard to the ﬁrst of IGAN’s early wartime activities,
namely the generation of military-geographical information, much
work was done in Alma Ata but a signiﬁcant amount was also done
by the handful of scientists who remained in Moscow following the
evacuation of the main body, with numbers of personnel there
rising from a low of 12 to more than 20 by the summer of 1942.35
These geographers worked in close cooperation with the Soviet
military and formed an integral element of the newly formed
Commission for GeologicaleGeographical Services to the Red Army,
which was established in July 1941 under Fersman’s leadership and
attached to the Division of GeologicaleGeographical Sciences of the
Academy of Sciences. In addition to personnel from IGAN, this body
also integrated scientists from the Institute of Cryopedology and
the Commission for Aerial Photography and Engineering Geology.36
More generally, IGAN responded to orders from a range of military
departments in order to produce an output which included hun-
dreds of specialist maps.37 Kotliakov and Preobrazhenskii provide a
detailed breakdown of the activities of IGAN between 1941 and
1943 drawing from the institute’s archives and other materials.38
These included the production of handbooks for the air force assuggest that pre-war links between geographers and the military in Germany were
war work and present status, Geographical Review 36 (1946) 398e408; C. Troll,
on, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 39 (1949) 99e137.
nnoi voine 1941e1945 godov, in: Nauka i uchenye (note 27), 7e23 (9).
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D.J.B. Shaw, J.D. Oldﬁeld / Journal of Historical Geography 47 (2015) 40e49 45well as methodological overviews for interpreting aerial photo-
graphs. Speciﬁc mention should also be made of the composition of
a whole series of maps of trafﬁcability or accessibility with
accompanying texts. These were designed to give the military
detailed descriptions of the terrain by, or close to, the front and its
suitability for various kinds of military operation. Here, the long-
standing Russian geographical tradition of landscape science was
found to be especially helpful.39 Much of the work was done in
Moscow under the direction of I.P. Gerasimov.40 The other signiﬁ-
cant project was the composition of detailed military-
topographical descriptions of Soviet territories and also of regions
beyond the western frontier. According to Abramov, this work
suffered from such shortcomings as lack of data, previous experi-
ence and an agreed methodology.41 Much of it was done by a
specialized ‘Defence’ group of IGAN, ﬁrstly in Moscow and then,
after evacuation, in Alma Ata. In addition to the geographers, other
specialists were also involved, including some from SOPS. General
accounts of these military-topographical descriptions lead one to
think that they probably had much in common with the UK’s
wartime Naval Intelligence Handbooks, but unfortunately few if
any were printed and they were inaccessible to Abramov in the
archives.42
In the course of 1943 and 1944, as the German armies retreated
westwards, the Academy of Sciences institutes gradually returned
to Moscow and changed in their orientation. Fersman’s Commis-
sion for GeologicaleGeographical Services to the Red Army was
closed in the second half of 1943 and much of its work transferred
to departments of the military. The attentions of geographers in
IGAN and elsewhere were now redirected towards issues con-
nected to the rehabilitation of war-ravaged regions.Lev Berg in wartime
Leningrad, the home of Lev Berg, was a city which in 1940 had
contained 146 scientiﬁc organizations, including 33 which
belonged to the Academy of Sciences network. No less than 39
academicians and 60 correspondingmembers of the Academy lived
and worked there. As German forces approached the city in July
1941, it therefore became the focus of a programme of urgent
evacuation. Berg, an important zoologist, ichthyologist, limnologist
and geographer and a corresponding member of the Academy, was
one of the ﬁrst scientists to be evacuated.
According to one account, Berg left Leningrad by train on July 22
in a special carriage together with seven academicians and
others.43 The train was headed for Borovoe, a health resort and
treatment centre for tuberculosis patients in northern Kazakhstan.39 Shaw and Oldﬁeld, Landscape science (note 24).
40 Abramov, Geograﬁia voiskam (note 27), 78; see also Doskach et al., Geograﬁia (note
particularly signiﬁcant work on the landscape effects of snow: G.D. Rikhter, Snezhnyy pokr
that because of the accent on physical geography, Soviet geography developed in close ass
which made important advances in this and the subsequent periods.
41 Abramov, Geograﬁia voiskam (note 27), 79e81.
42 For more details about the UK handbooks, see: H. Clout and C. Gosme, The Naval
Geography 27 (2003) 153e73; D. Matless, J.D. Oldﬁeld and A. Swain, Encountering Sovie
Europe 1945e1991, Social & Cultural Geography 8 (2007) 352e372.
43 Nauka i uchenye (note 27), 24, 27. According to another account, however, Berg lef
Izvestiia Vsesoiuznogo Geograﬁcheskogo obshchestva (1970) no. 1, 85e88 (85).
44 Zolotnitskaia, L. S. Berg (note 43), 85.
45 Berg, Acquired Traits (note 30), 75.
46 Zolotnitskaia, L. S. Berg (note 43), 85.
47 Shaw and Oldﬁeld, Totalitarianism (note 24), 106.
48 Berg, Acquired Traits (note 30), 2.
49 Berg, Acquired Traits (note 30), 76.
50 Zolotnitskaia, L. S. Berg (note 43), 86e87.
51 Berg, Acquired Traits (note 30), 1e5.Borovoe had apparently long been noted for ‘its superb coniferous
forests set amidst picturesque mountains, its numerous beautiful
lakes, its healing climate’, and all ‘in themidst of the endless Kazakh
steppe’,44 or, in the words of Raisa Berg, ‘one of the most beautiful
spots in the world’.45 However, life in Borovoe was not necessarily
as idyllic as these words may suggest. The 200 or so people from
Leningrad, Moscow and other places, crowded together in a single
hostel plus some outbuildings, inevitably suffered the wartime
deprivations, shortages and frustrations of unwelcome evacuation
or exile, even if they were undoubtedly privileged by comparison
with those left behind. The social scene also left something to be
desired. Thus, although the forced coming together been described
as ‘an unrepeatable constellation of Russian scholars’,46 facilitating
close interaction, for example, between Berg and his former teacher
Vernadskii, the group also included Academician A.N. Bakh, a close
ally of Lysenko and one of the signatories of the January 1939 letter
to Pravdawhich had resulted in the denial of Berg’s election to full
membership of the Academy of Sciences.47 No doubt some in-
teractions were morewelcome to the resort’s denizens than others.
Berg appears to have attracted a good deal of respect not only for
his single-minded dedication to science but also for his integrity
and selﬂessness. His daughter Raisa, referring to her childhood in
the First World War, summarizes his character in the following
way: ‘My father, a follower of Lev Tolstoy, a paciﬁst and a vege-
tarian, wanted to raise children in ignorance of evil. We were
supposed to know that the life of a person, an animal or a plant was
inviolable. To destroy a plant for the sake of a moment’s pleasure
was just as reprehensible as torturing an animal’. She goes on to
assert that the childrenwere never allowed pets or Christmas trees,
were never taken to the zoo, and were forbidden to play with toy
soldiers or toy guns in case they ‘led us to thoughts of war or
murder. We weren’t supposed to know that there was a war going
on’.48 Soon after arriving at Borovoe, Berg was elected by his fellow
Academy members to membership of a committee responsible for
the distribution of rooms, clothes and other necessities. According
to Raisa, this was in consequence of his ‘asceticism and readiness to
serve people’.49 He was noted as a peacemaker and for the fact that
his door was always open to those seeking help.50 But Berg’s
character did not necessarily attract universal admiration. Raisa, for
example, is extremely critical about her early upbringing under his
stern, unbending principles.51
Since Berg was already 65 years old by the time he arrived in
Borovoe, he was of course well beyond the age of military service.
Neither does he appear to have been directly involved in
militarily-oriented research. Leningrad University had been evac-
uated to Saratov on the Volga and he was therefore relieved of33), 7. IGAN scientists were also involved in weather forecasting, and produced a
ov, ego formirovanie i svoistva, Moscow, 1945. It should be noted, as suggested above,
ociation with other natural sciences like geology, soil science and meteorology, all of
Intelligence Handbooks: A monument in geographical writing, Progress in Human
t geography: oral histories of British geographical studies of the USSR and Eastern
t on July 14. See R.L. Zolotnitskaia, L. S. Berg v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,
D.J.B. Shaw, J.D. Oldﬁeld / Journal of Historical Geography 47 (2015) 40e4946normal teaching duties, though he does seem to have taught local
groups, often at a popular level. One of the most important of his
scientiﬁc activities, however, derived from his association with the
nearby ‘Zolotoi Bor’ nature reserve, whose scientiﬁc council he
joined soon after his arrival. As an interesting example of the way
that Soviet scientists at this period strove to appear practical, the
council, with Berg as secretary, sent the government of
Kazakhstan a request in September, 1941 to include the scientists
at Borovoe in the nature reserve’s research activities, investigating
problems ‘having current economic signiﬁcance’. In consequence
Berg was personally assigned two research tasks: to investigate
the ﬁsh resources of the region’s lakes with a view to their uti-
lization, and to analyse local meteorological data, collected over
many years, with the aim of developing a better understanding of
local climate and its signiﬁcance for human health. As a long-
standing student of the climate and lakes of the region, Berg was
well placed to undertake such research although, judging by lists
of his scientiﬁc publications, neither research task bore signiﬁcant
fruit.52
As president of the Geographical Society, Berg held signiﬁcant
responsibilities, but wartime communications proved difﬁcult. The
society continued to function, albeit in much diminished form, in
the besieged city of Leningrad, providing somemilitary intelligence
and geographical advice to those requiring it. The greater part of the
premises it occupied, however, was taken over as a military hos-
pital.53 Berg appears to have busied himself at Borovoe with
editorial and refereeing duties on behalf of the society in so far as
wartime conditions allowed. Most important, however, was his
work on the volume dedicated to the society’s hundredth anni-
versary which was due to be celebrated in 1945. The book was
eventually published in 1946.54
Publishing opportunities were inevitably limited in wartime.
Nonetheless, Berg wrote numerous scientiﬁc papers and books,
many of which were published soon after the war. Most notable
were books on the Bering expedition and on the history of Russian
geographical discoveries, the third edition of his book on the USSR’s
natural zones, the second edition of his Climate and Life, and the
fourth edition of his classic work on the freshwater ﬁsh of the USSR
and neighbouring countries.55
The siege of Leningrad was ﬁnally lifted in January 1944 and life
in the city slowly began to return to normal. The university
returned from its Saratov exile at the end of June, but Berg’s arrival
was delayed until 29 August when, as he wrote, he returned to the
city ‘towards the evening of a ﬁne sunny day’.56 Within a few days
he had resumed his duties as chair of the department of physical
geography at the university and as president of the quickly-reviving
Geographical Society. Life in the last winter of the war remained
harsh, however. But Berg continued to work assiduously and
without complaint, even enduring for a time a lack of fuel for his
ofﬁce stove. His ﬁnal wartime activity was to appear together with
senior members of the university, the Party and other organizations
at a mass rally held in front of the main university building on52 Bibliograﬁia izbrannykh geograﬁcheskikh trudov L. S. Berga, Voprosy Geograﬁi 24 (1
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Vsesoiuznogo Geograﬁcheskogo obshchestva 75 (1943) no. 6, 44e62.
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59 I.M. Zabelin, Puteshestvie v glub’ nauki (Akademik A. A. Grigor’ev), Moscow, 1946; DoVictory Day, May 9,1945, reportedly celebrating the occasionwith a
‘rousing and heartfelt speech’.57Andrei Grigor’ev in wartime
Whilst Berg spent the war years far removed from events on the
front, Grigor’ev’s position was very different. At 58 he was still
active and, as director of the USSR’s leading geographical research
institute, a body which was set to play a signiﬁcant wartime role,
his responsibilities were heavy. On the ﬁfth day of the war, calling
all the institute’s staff to a meeting in his ofﬁce in Moscow, Gri-
gor’ev announced IGAN’s inclusion in the new Commission for
GeologicaleGeographical Services to the Red Army under Acade-
mician Fersman. Grigor’ev himself was appointed Fersman’s dep-
uty, responsible for the provision of all geographical services
needed at the front and by the country’s wartime economy. There
followed a throughgoing reconstruction of the institute’s work,
which now moved from a traditional focus on systematic branches
of the discipline to the fulﬁlment of speciﬁc wartime tasks and the
solution of designated problems. This in turn meant the reorgani-
zation of the institute’s staff into ‘complex’ groups (or groups
containing a range of specialists, depending on the task in hand)
and expeditions. These set quickly towork, with Grigor’ev taking an
immediate role, supervising the overall direction of the work and
closely editing all the maps, texts and other materials produced.58
Another difference between Berg and Grigor’ev was that Mos-
cow was not as immediately threatened by German forces as was
Leningrad. But life in Moscow soon became difﬁcult, with bombing
raids by the Luftwaffe beginning by July 21. For a few months the
Academy institutes were able to remain, however, particularly once
it became clear that Stalin and the government were not about to
ﬂee to Kuibyshev on the Volga, as originally envisaged. In these
circumstances Grigor’ev’s leadership skills came quickly to the fore.
It is interesting to note that, whilst Berg generally seems to have
attracted the respect of his colleagues, opinions of Grigor’ev’s
character were sharply contrasting. On the one hand there were
those like his biographer, I.M. Zabelin, and close co-worker, A.G.
Doskach, who admired him for his scientiﬁc insight and his lead-
ership qualities during the war.59 Thus, Doskach poses the question
whether the conferral of the Fighting Order of the Patriotic War,
second class, on Grigor’ev at the end of the war was merely in
recognition of his authority and position as director, as some have
asserted. As a witness of his active role in the planning and direc-
tion of the work of the institute ‘to the beneﬁt of the Fatherland’,
she strongly refutes this idea. ‘Simple and natural, precise and
business-like, from the very beginning of the war he included the
Institute of Geography in the systematic work of according direct
assistance to the front and in the discovery and mobilization of the
resources of the rear for the country’s wartime economy’.
Describing the difﬁculties of working in Moscow in the war’s early
months with nightly air raids by the Luftwaffe, Doskach asserts that
‘Andrei Aleksandrovich shared the difﬁculties with everyone and951) 441e458. See also the bibliography compiled by Berg’s widow, M.M. Berg, in:
59.
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skach, Akademik A. A. Grigor’ev (note 58), 59e61.
D.J.B. Shaw, J.D. Oldﬁeld / Journal of Historical Geography 47 (2015) 40e49 47always seemed cheerful and unwearied. No-one knew when he
slept; one could always ﬁnd him at work in the director’s ofﬁce; it
was always possible to go to him for help and advice’. Summing up,
Doskach describes his attitude, including ‘his certainty that victory
would be ours’, as providing ‘great moral support’ to his colleagues
at such a threatening time.
Entirely contrary assessments of Grigor’ev’s character were
provided by others, however. For example, N.N. Baranskii, the
economic geographer at MGU, and K.K. Markov, physical geogra-
pher ﬁrstly at IGAN and then MGU, were extremely critical of Gri-
gor’ev’s scientiﬁc and political pretensions and of his domination of
the institute. But these criticisms relate mainly to the difﬁcult post-
war period.60
One of the ﬁrst demands made of IGAN in the very ﬁrst days of
the war was to make an urgent assessment of alternative regions
that might assume the role of the USSR’s breadbasket to replace the
rich lands of the forest-steppe, and steppe lands of the southern
part of the European USSR which were now being occupied by the
enemy. Beginning in July, therefore, and continuing into October
the institute organized a ‘complex Kazakh expedition’ under the
supervision of Grigor’ev and the economic geographer P.V. Pogor-
el’skii with the aim of mobilizing the republic’s land resources.61
The ﬁrst results of the expedition were presented to USSR GOS-
PLAN and GOSPLAN of the Kazakh SSR before the end of October in
the form of maps, and texts. They received a high commendation. It
may have been on the basis of this work, and of some pre-war
studies, that in October 1941 it was decided to evacuate the
greater part of the institute to Kazakhstan as the German armies
menaced Moscow. In Kazakhstan, despite the difﬁculties of main-
taining communications with the capital, the geographers could
continue their work undisturbed, thus making a valuable contri-
bution to the war effort. According to Doskach, Grigor’ev had no
wish to leave Moscow but was constrained to do so by government
order on the night of 15e16 October. He was accompanied by col-
leagues as well as by academicians and members of other Academy
institutes.62
Once established in Alma Ata, Grigor’ev was able to organize the
Kazakhstan expedition to achieve two major goals: ﬁrstly, to in-
crease the amount of arable land available to both non-irrigated
and irrigated agriculture; and, secondly, to evaluate and to make
recommendations for increasing the amount and productivity of
grazing land not only to provide for the republic’s own livestock but
also for that evacuated from the war-threatened regions. The
institute was tasked with a detailed survey of the republic’s agri-
cultural lands, focusing in the ﬁrst instance on the six north-eastern
oblasts (regions) which were those with the best potentials for
non-irrigated agriculture. An interesting example of the kind of
work produced by these detachments is P.I. Koloskov’s text on The
agroclimatological regionalization of Kazakhstan, published in
1947.63 On the basis of comprehensive ﬁeldwork and also statistical
data provided by the republics and local bodies, the author gave a60 See Shaw and Oldﬁeld, Scientiﬁc, institutional and personal rivalries (note 24); also
61 Doskach, Akademik A. A. Grigor’ev (note 58), 62 ff.
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63 P.I. Koloskov, Agroklimaticheskoe raionirovanie Kazakhstana. 1. Tekst. Trudy po izucheni
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68 Krementsov, Stalinist Science (note 10), 129; also Pollock, Stalin (note 10).detailed analysis of climatological (including microclimatological)
and agroclimatological factors for the region, including bioclimatic
indicators for no less than 41 ﬁeld cultures. He was then able to
subdivide the republic into four agroclimatological zones, obviously
a valuable basis for the future agricultural colonization of the re-
gion.64 In fact, according to some accounts, IGAN’s work in northern
Kazakhstan during the war provided the basis for Khrushchev’s
much-publicized Virgin and Idle Lands agricultural campaign in the
1950s, although this fact does not seem to be widely known among
Western scholars.65 Grigor’ev himself, as well as overseeing the
work and output of the expedition in general terms, busied himself
on a detailed physico-geographical regionalization of Kazakhstan
which gave rise to later publications.66
Grigor’ev and IGAN returned to Moscow at the end of 1943
where he continued to supervise the institute’s work, including its
reorientation towards the revival of the economies and infra-
structure of war-damaged cities and regions. Clearly, given the di-
versity of his activities during the war (not all of which are detailed
above), Grigor’ev had only very limited time for his own research.
Nevertheless, he was able to undertake a little, notably some
theoretical work on his concept of ‘the physicalegeographical
process’, and to publish two signiﬁcant books just after the war’s
conclusion: his seminal work on the Subarctic, and a centenary
volume dedicated to V.V. Dokuchaev and his links with
geography.67
Aftermath: Soviet geographers and the onset of the Cold War
(1945e1953)
It is therefore evident that the particularities of the Soviet Union’s
war experience provided its geographers with considerable scope
to contribute to the war effort. The openness of the Soviet Union’s
western borders to invasion, the relocation of signiﬁcant parts of
the country’s economic production to the east, and the need to
trace and evaluate strategic natural resources in order to support
the front line, all required major input from geographers. To a large
extent, the geographers were successful in rising to this challenge,
producing a considerable volume of strategically important data in
order both to facilitate military action and to address the consid-
erable strategic issues on the home front. Nevertheless, in spite of
this apparent success, the early post-war years were not straight-
forward for Soviet geography; indeed, by 1948e1950, the disci-
pline’s war exploits were sidelined as it came under attack from
Party ideologues who questioned geography’s overall direction and
purpose.
Much of this can be explained by the relatively rapid shift in the
status and position of Soviet science more broadly in the years
following the ending of the war. This shift was precipitated above
all by the breakdown of the wartime alliance with theWest and the
onset of the Cold War. As documented by Krementsov,68 this led to
the emergence of a ‘new, strident ideological campaign’ in theK.K. Markov, Vospominaniia i razmyshleniia geografa, Moscow, 1973, 54e55.
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D.J.B. Shaw, J.D. Oldﬁeld / Journal of Historical Geography 47 (2015) 40e4948immediate post-war period, driven forward by Andrei Zhdanov in
order to reassert Party control across society. This shift would end
up having a marked inﬂuence on Soviet science. Thus, according to
von Mohrenschildt,69 the Party orchestrated an ‘attack’ on what
were termed ‘survivals of capitalism’ including ‘individualistic
tendencies’ and ‘proﬁteering’ amongst other aberrations.70 With
speciﬁc regard to the scientiﬁc community, a key area of concern
was the scientists’ alleged ‘slavish’ attachment to Western science
and culture, a concern that would effectively undermine the
development and maintenance of the USSR’s international scien-
tiﬁc links.71 Inevitably the geographers were unable to escape the
consequences.
It is instructive to focus on the fate of IGAN during this period.
According to Kotliakov, discussions in geography, precipitated to a
large extent by the contemporaneous debates within biology over
Lysenkoism, quickly transformed themselves into much wider and
potentially damaging clashes over the fundamental character of
geography and its contribution to society.72 A ﬂurry of publications
appeared which developed this theme and criticized the current
focus of geography within IGAN as well as the leadership role of
Grigor’ev (who subsequently lost his position as IGAN’s director).
Thus there was a re-emergence of the pre-war debate over the
character and role of geography in a socialist society, at the centre of
which were Berg and Grigor’ev.73 A further development occurred
with the publication of an article by A.M. Smirnov in the inﬂuential
journal Voprosy Filosoﬁi [Questions of Philosophy] in 1950 entitled
‘The Bases of Geographical Science’.74 Smirnov argued that geog-
raphy’s recent achievements had fallen short of expectations
because geographical theory had failed to address practical issues
in a ‘purposeful’ manner.75 Furthermore, he accused the geogra-
phers of basic weaknesses in both theory andmethodology and of a
continued adherence to ‘bourgeois views and opinions.’76 In the
context of late Stalinism, such denunciations were serious. They
pointed to the discipline’s theoretical shortcomings (including an
implied failure to abide fully by the canons of dialectical materi-
alism) and its inadequate contribution to the reconstruction of
socialist society.
In Smirnov’s view, geography had an important part to play in
facilitating the ‘transformation of nature’ which had emerged as a
central component of Soviet society’s construction of communism.
At the heart of the transformation of nature rhetoric at this time
was the 1948 decree which became known as the Great Stalin Plan
for Transformation of Nature.77 Although the planwould ultimately
be cancelled following the death of Stalin in 1953, it was a massive
undertaking. The geographers were destined to have a key role in
its implementation because of their collective expertise in areas
such as climatology, hydrology and soil science, and in their ability
to synthesize complex ﬁndings.78 It was the uncertainties and69 D. von Mohrenschildt, Postwar Party line of the All-Union Communist Party of the
70 Von Mohrenschildt, Postwar (note 69), 174e175.
71 Krementsov, Stalinist Science (note 10), 129e183.
72 Kotliakov, Institut (note 35), 20e22.
73 Shaw and Oldﬁeld, Scientiﬁc, institutional and personal rivalries (note 24), 1397e14
74 A.M. Smirnov, Ob osnovakh geograﬁcheskoi nauki, Voprosy Filosoﬁi 2 (1950) 83e103
75 Smirnov, Ob osnovakh (note 74), 83e84.
76 Smirnov, Ob osnovakh (note 74), 84.
77 See Pravda and Izvestiia, 24 October, 1948.
78 For a discussion of the way in which those geographers working in the area of clima
post-1945, see J.D. Oldﬁeld, Climate modiﬁcation and climate change debates amongst So
org/10.1002/wcc.242.
79 Abramov, Geograﬁia voiskam (note 27), 71.
80 Ackerman, Geographic training (note 3), 121.
81 See Abramov, Geograﬁia voiskam (note 27), 72e75; Ackerman, Geographic training (n
Geographic science (note 28). For the UK, see W. Balchin, United Kingdom geographers in
(1983) 14e26.difﬁculties which the geographers encountered in attempting to
contribute to this plan which fuelled the debates of the period.
The crisis in Soviet geography in the post-war period was in
effect a continuation of the same issues that stemmed from
implementation of Stalin’s ‘Great Turn’ in 1930. The Great Patriotic
War of 1941e1945 represented an interlude of crisis of a slightly
different kind. The key issue throughout was the extent to which
the geographers were able to make practical, scientiﬁc contribu-
tions to society, and, perhaps more pertinently, to persuade the
politicians that they had the skills to do so. Thus, whereas, in
Barnes’ words, American geography was ‘shaped by approaches to
war’, Soviet geography was shaped through a crisis, of which the
Great Patriotic War was only one part.Conclusion
This paper has been able to provide only a very partial view of the
activities of Soviet geographers, and of the two individuals who are
the focus of our study, during the Great Patriotic War. Much more
research is required before a full picture can be provided. At the
same time, reviewing the available sources, one is struck by un-
certainties over whether such a full account can in fact ever be
given. Perhaps more than any other type of episode in human
history, war and accounts of war seem pervaded by emotion and
ideology. Thus Soviet and Russian accounts are suffused by patriotic
sentiment and nationalist rhetoric. All the participants in the war
are bold, determined, and entirely loyal to the Fatherland. Little or
no space is allowed for the fears and ambivalences which some
individuals must inevitably have felt. Likewise one is struck by the
silences in the sources. The Nazi enemy is naturally excoriated for
its brutality, including its anti-Semitism. But nothing is said about
the brutality of the Stalin regime, including the anti-Semitism
which characterized Stalin’s latter years. It is a sobering thought
that Berg himself might have suffered in consequence of the latter,
had he lived longer. Hence a balanced account of the period seems
all but impossible. But this is surely true of episodes involving war
in every country.
A.E. Fersman argued that the war had promoted the prestige of
geography as a major contributor to the war effort.79 Ackerman
made much the same point with regard to geography in the USA,
thus underlining the close connections between geography and
war.80 It is interesting to note, however, that despite Abramov’s
claimwith respect to the Axis powers, the links between geography
and the military seem to have been tenuous in every case in the
pre-war period.81 Only with the outbreak of war did geographers
become involved in military intelligence and similar activities, and
even then it took several years for them to become fully integrated.
Detailed administrative arrangements differed in differentUSSR, Russia Review 9 (1950) 171e178 (172e174).
18 (1413e1415).
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D.J.B. Shaw, J.D. Oldﬁeld / Journal of Historical Geography 47 (2015) 40e49 49countries and need not detain us. But it is an important comment
on the skills which the geographers were able to bring to military
problems (or were not able to bring, as detailed by Ackerman and
Barnes for the US, though there is no such parallel commentary for
the USSR) that in all cases geographers became involved in similar
work: map analysis; the production of new kinds of maps for
military use; terrain, marine and hydrographic analysis; meteoro-
logical studies; the production of intelligence handbooks for both
the home and foreign fronts, and so on. It took several years for
geographers to adjust to the demands of wartime but some
important scientiﬁc advances were made as a result. The longer-
term implications for geography in the US have been examined
by Barnes in some detail, but unfortunately no such studies exist for
the USSR. This is more the pity as the USSR does provide some cases
of wartime experiences which were unique in the European
context, notably the geographers’ engagement with resource
mobilization in some of the remoter regions of the country, and the
evacuation of key scientists to places hundreds or even thousands
of miles behind the front. Soviet geographers therefore had op-
portunities for furthering their research which were not easily
paralleled elsewhere on the continent.
Ethan Pollock has argued that, under Stalin, ‘science for science’s
sake was not good enough; all science had to play a role in socialist
construction’.82 A weak, descriptive geography, irrelevant to the
issue of nature transformation, was unlikely to survive after Stalin’s82 Pollock, Stalin (note 10), 59.‘Great Turn’ at the beginning of the 1930s. Thereafter Soviet ge-
ographers needed to strive for scientiﬁc rigour, even if they did not
always attain it. The situation was thus very different from that in
the USA where, in Barnes’ words, ‘approaches to geography were
shaped by war’. In the USSR, it was the Stalin era as a whole, rather
than the Great Patriotic War only, that was crucial to the emerging
character of the discipline. Indeed, what is perhaps remarkable is
that the ideological and scientiﬁc cleavages and tensions between
the geographers came to the fore in the 1930s and with the onset of
the Cold War rather than during the war itself. These cleavages
helped shape the character of Soviet geography for the future and
were at least as signiﬁcant in this regard as the war itself. The ef-
fects of the war, in other words, varied from country to country.
Perhaps evenmore profoundly, the actual experience of war almost
certainly varied from geographer to geographer.Acknowledgements
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